  Setting Up Your New Domain Mini-HOWTO.
  by Christopher Neufeld (neufeld@physics.utoronto.ca)
  (neufeld@thepuffingroup.com).
  version 0.5. 1999/12/23.

  This document outlines the things you will probably have to do when
  you want to set up a network of computers under your own domain. It
  covers configuration of network parameters, network services, and
  security settings.
  ______________________________________________________________________

  Table of Contents






















































  1. Notices

     1.1 Disclaimer
     1.2 Copyright

  2. Introduction

  3. Planning Your Network Topology

  4. Obtaining Your Connection

     4.1 Choosing Your Provider
     4.2 Preparing For Hardware Installation
     4.3 Testing The Connection
     4.4 Using A Dynamic IP

  5. Registering A Domain Name

  6. Deciding Which Domain Services You Will Host

     6.1 Primary DNS Authority
     6.2 Electronic Mail
     6.3 Web Space Hosting
     6.4 FTP Site Hosting
     6.5 Packet Filtering

  7. Configuring Your Hosted Services

     7.1 Setting up Name Resolution
        7.1.1 DNS On Private Network, ISP Handles Domain
        7.1.2 Non-DNS Resolution On Private Network, ISP Handles Domain
        7.1.3 You Are Primary DNS Authority For Domain
        7.1.4 Fully Exposed Network, Hosted By ISP
     7.2 DNS Configuration If You Are Not Hosting Email
     7.3 Setting up Electronic Mail
        7.3.1 A Solution Using "sendmail"
        7.3.2 Solutions Using Other Mail Transfer Agents
     7.4 Setting up Web Space Hosting
     7.5 Setting up FTP Hosting
     7.6 Setting up Packet Filtering

  8. Securing Your Domain

     8.1 Configuring Your Firewall
     8.2 Configuring SSH1
     8.3 Configuring X
     8.4 Configuring Disk Sharing

  9. Acknowledgements

  10. Glossary of Terms



  ______________________________________________________________________

  1.  Notices

  1.1.  Disclaimer

  This is a very preliminary document. I have glossed over many things
  which could be given in much more detail, and have probably missed
  important sections entirely. I need feedback on this document before I
  can make it widely available. Any suggestions for additions,
  deletions, or areas where I ought to provide more or less detail are
  very welcome.
  1.2.  Copyright

  Copyright (c) by Christopher Neufeld.  This document may be
  distributed only subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
  LDP License at this location <http://www.linuxdoc.org/COPYRIGHT.html>.



  2.  Introduction

  This is a guide to setting up your own domain of Linux machines, or
  mixed Linux and Windows machines, on an always-up connection with a
  static IP and a named domain. It is not really intended for setups
  which use dynamic IPs, or which are regularly disconnected from their
  provider for long periods of time, though some basic hints for
  operating such a setup are available in section ``Using A Dynamic
  IP''.


  With the increasing availability of permanent connections and static
  IPs, it's becoming easier for people and organizations to set up a
  real domain, with the associated Internet presence. Proper planning at
  the outset can reduce problems later.


  Much of this document describes techniques for implementing
  unobtrusive security on the newly exposed network. This deals with
  protection from external attack, and from casual internal attack. It
  does not claim to provide an extremely secure setup, but is usually
  enough to discourage the less determined attacker.


  This document is primarily directed at small organizations which have
  an existing network of computers, possibly with a shared dialup line,
  which are trying to move to a permanent, relatively high-speed
  connection, either to improve data transfer with the outside world, or
  to create a WWW or FTP site. The document is also directed at new
  organizations which want to skip the early stage and start out with
  higher speed networking and services under their own domain name.


  Throughout this document, I will discuss the configuration of a newly
  registered domain, example.com. Note that the name example.com is
  reserved by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority for use in
  documentation, and so will never correspond to an actual domain.


  Much of the information in this document is available in other places.
  I have tried to distill the material relevant to the creation of a new
  domain. Where detail on a specific subject is lacking, you may want to
  consult one of the more comprehensive documents.


  This document will also assume a mixed OS environment. Specifically, I
  will assume that some desktop machines are running some version of
  Microsoft Windows, while servers and the private network gateway are
  running Linux.




  3.  Planning Your Network Topology

  While there are arguments which can be made for many different network
  layouts, the requirements of many organizations can be met by putting
  the desktop machines and private servers on a private masqueraded
  subnet, and the publicly accessible machines on valid external IPs.
  The machines on valid external IPs will be referred to in this
  document as ``exposed hosts''. This leads to the following (example)
  topology:



       +--------------+
       |              |               +---------------+
       | ISP-supplied |---------------| FTP server    |
       | router       |        |      +---------------+
       |              |        |
       +--------------+        |      +---------------+
                               |------| WWW server #1 |
                               |      +---------------+
                               |
                               |      +---------------+
                               |------| WWW server #2 |
                               |      +---------------+
                               |
                               ~
                               ~
                               |
                               |      +---------------+
                               |------| Private       |
                                      | Network       |
                                      | Gateway       |
                                      +---------------+
                                             |
                                             |
                                             |
                                             |
            +------------+                   |      +-------------------+
            | Desktop #1 |-------------------|------| Private server #1 |
            +------------+                   |      +-------------------+
                                             |
                   .      -------------------|--------        .
                   .                         |                .
                   .      -------------------|--------        .
                                             |
            +------------+                   |      +-------------------+
            | Desktop #N |-------------------|------| Private server #N |
            +------------+                          +-------------------+





  In this example, the router provided by the ISP (Internet Service
  Provider), FTP server, WWW servers, and the machine labelled ``private
  network gateway'' all have externally visible IP numbers, while the
  desktop and private server machines have IP numbers allocated from RFC
  1918 <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1918.txt>, reserved for private use.
  The IP numbers you choose for use within the private network
  (everything below the private network gateway machine) should be
  chosen to be unique, not only among the hosts under your control, but
  should also not conflict with numbers assigned on similar private
  subnets at other sites or partner companies with whom you might, at
  some time, want to implement a virtual private network, in order to
  reduce confusion and reconfiguration when the networks are merged in
  that way. As outlined in the RFC, you can choose from any class C
  network from 192.168.0.* to 192.168.255.*, or any class B network from
  172.16.*.* to 172.31.*.*, or the class A network 10.*.*.*. In the rest
  of this document I will assume that your private network (if you've
  chosen to create one) is on the class C network 192.168.1.*, and your
  private network gateway machine is at IP number 10.1.1.9, one of the
  IP numbers provided to you by your provider (note that this is not a
  valid external IP, I use it as an example only). I will also assume
  that there is a machine, betty.example.com, at 10.1.1.10, which will
  handle both www and FTP services.


  Take note of the number of external IP numbers which you need for your
  own machines. You will need one IP number for each machine which lies
  outside the private network gateway, plus one for the gateway itself.
  This count does not include any IP numbers which may be taken by
  routers, broadcast addresses, and so on. You should ask your provider
  for a block of addresses large enough to mount the given number of
  machines. For example, in my office network, of the 8 IP numbers
  allocated from the ISP, three were not usable by my computers, leaving
  enough IP numbers for four machines outside the gateway, plus the
  gateway itself.


  This network topology is not correct for everybody, but it is a
  reasonable starting point for many configurations which don't have
  special needs. The advantages of this configuration include:

  o  Easy expandability. If you suddenly double your number of private
     nodes, you don't have to worry about getting a new IP block from
     your provider and reconfiguring all of the interfaces on your
     machines.

  o  Local network control. Adding a new workstation to your private
     network requires no communication with your provider, unlike
     exposed nodes, which need both forward and reverse DNS (domain name
     service) mappings if they are to perform certain tasks (ssh and
     ftpd may complain if they can't perform reverse and forward DNS on
     incoming connections). A reverse DNS query is an attempt to obtain
     the host name from the IP number.

  o  Centralized security. The private network gateway can enforce
     security over the whole private network, filtering packets and
     logging attacks, rather than having to install such measures on
     each desktop and server on the private network. This can be
     enforced not only on incoming packets, but also on outgoing
     packets, so that a misconfigured desktop machine doesn't
     inadvertently broadcast data to the outside world which ought to
     remain internal.

  o  Easy transplantability. Because the IP numbers within the private
     network are yours for as long as you want them, you can move the
     entire network to a new range of IP numbers without having to make
     any changes to the network configuration on the private network.
     The publicly exposed hosts still have to be reconfigured, of
     course.

  o  Transparent Internet access. The machines on your private network
     can still use FTP, telnet, WWW, and other services with minimal
     obstruction, assuming a Linux masquerading router. The users may
     not even be aware that their machines are not on externally visible
     IP numbers.


  Some of the potential disadvantages of such a configuration are:

  o  Some services will not be available directly to the machines on the
     internal network. NTP synchronization against an outside host,
     certain obscure services which may not have masquerading rules in
     the kernel, and .shosts authentication for logging in to external
     nodes are all difficult or impossible, but simple workarounds are
     almost always available.
  o  More network hardware costs. The private network gateway machine
     needs two network cards, and you need at least two hubs / switches,
     one on the visible network and one on the private network.

  o  Machines outside the private network cannot easily make direct
     connections to machines within the private network. They may have
     to open a session first on the private network gateway machine,
     then log through to the internal host. It is possible to route
     packets transparently through the firewall, but this is not
     recommended for security reasons which will be discussed in a later
     section.


  You should consider these points in planning your network topology,
  and decide if a fully visible network is more appropriate for your
  situation. In the rest of this document I will assume that you have
  configured your network as shown above. If you have chosen to have a
  fully visible network, some details will differ, and I will try to
  point out such differences in this document.


  As a special case, if you do not need any external servers, the ISP-
  supplied router can be attached directly to your external interface on
  the private network gateway machine, rather than with a hub.



  4.  Obtaining Your Connection


  4.1.  Choosing Your Provider

  As with anything, shop around. Determine which services are available
  in your area, as well as the costs associated with those services. Not
  all locations are wired to accept DSL, and some locations may not be
  suitable for wireless connections due to constraints of the landscape,
  architecture, or environment. Be prepared to provide the street
  address of the location where your hookup will be installed, as DSL
  speeds are strongly dependent on your distance from the switch, and
  ask specifically about such details as bandwidth between your machine
  and the provider, what has to be done to install the connection, and
  what hardware is provided in the quoted monthly rate. Also, you should
  have some idea of how many IP numbers you need for your own machines
  (remember that not all IP numbers in the block you get from the
  provider will be available for attaching your computers).  Ask the
  provider what their total bandwidth is out to the outside world, as
  the quoted speed is only between your site and theirs. If the provider
  has insufficient bandwidth to the outside, the customers will suffer
  bottlenecks within the provider's network.


  Once you have narrowed down a list of candidates, ask around, see if
  anybody can provide you with recommendations for the services you're
  considering. Ask them what sort of bandwidth they get to unloaded
  sites. Also, if you intend to have fast connections between the new
  domain and local ISP accounts from home, for telecommuting, or just
  remote administration, it is essential that you do a traceroute from
  your home ISP account to a host operating on the service you're
  considering. This will tell you how many hops, and how much latency
  you should expect, between home and the new domain. Latencies much
  above 100 to 200 milliseconds can be difficult to use for extended
  periods of time. The traceroute should be run around the time of day
  that you expect to make use of the network connection between home and
  the new domain.


  4.2.  Preparing For Hardware Installation

  After you have chosen the provider and service type for the new
  domain, ask about installation details. You may require service calls
  from the telephone company as well as from the ISP in order to install
  the service, and the technicians may need access to controlled areas
  of your building, so inform the building engineer of the installation
  requirements.


  Before the ISP technician arrives, ask for the network parameters,
  specifically the IP number, netmask, broadcast address, gateway
  routing address, DNS server address, and also what cabling you need to
  connect to the hardware delivered by the technician (i.e. straight-
  through or crossover RJ45 cabling, etc.).


  Have one machine available for testing, and put it close to where the
  network connection hardware will be installed. If possible, configure
  it before the service technician arrives, setting the IP number and
  netmask, and have the appropriate cabling ready so that the
  installation and testing can be done quickly.



  4.3.  Testing The Connection

  With your test machine attached to the ISP's hardware, make sure that
  you can ping sites beyond the ISP. If not, a traceroute to the outside
  can help to show where the connection is failing. If traceroute shows
  no successful hops it indicates that your test machine's network
  configuration (default route, interface address, NIC drivers, DNS,
  etc.) is incorrectly set. If it shows one hop, that could mean that
  your router is not correctly configured to communicate with the ISP.
  If it shows several hops before failing, the problem is almost
  certainly in the ISP or in the outside world, and beyond your
  immediate control.



  4.4.  Using A Dynamic IP

  The benefits of a corporate connection, with a static IP block and
  various hosted services, comes with a cost. It can be more than ten
  times as expensive as a high speed home connection on DSL or cable
  modem. If the budget can't support a corporate connection, or if no
  such connections are available in your area, you might want to try to
  set up a domain on a dynamic IP. Instead of a range of IP numbers, you
  typically get exactly one, which means that your private network
  gateway machine will also have to host any incoming services from the
  outside.


  First, you might want to check the legality of it. Many companies'
  user agreements explicitly forbid setting up externally-accessible
  servers on personal accounts. They may enforce this with packet
  filters blocking incoming connections on the http and FTP ports. You
  should also be aware that the quoted connection speed for personal
  accounts such as home DSL or cable modem are the downlink speeds, and
  that the uplink speeds might be much slower. The uplink speed is what
  is important for serving up FTP or web content.


  If you have a dynamic IP, and you want to have incoming connections,
  you will have to subscribe to a dynamic IP hosting service, such as
  DynIP <http://www.dynip.com/>, DynHOST <http://www.dynhost.com/>, or
  TZO <http://www.tzo.com/>. These all work by running software on your
  machine which passes your current IP number on to the company's
  servers. When your current IP number arrives at the servers, their DNS
  tables are updated to reflect the new value. You can either get a
  domain name under their domain name, such as ``example.dynip.com'' or
  ``example.dynhost.com'', or you can register your own domain and set
  the primary DNS authority to point to the company providing this
  service (usually at a higher cost).


  There is also a free hosting service, at Domain Host Services
  <http://www.dhs.org/>. They seem fairly new, and there are few details
  on their web site at the moment, but you might find it worth a look.


  If you have set up a dynamic IP, and subscribed to one of these
  services, it will affect some of the decisions you make in section
  ``Deciding Which Domain Services You Will Host''. In particular, there
  is little point subscribing to a dynamic IP hosting service if you do
  not plan to host at least one of web or FTP services. You will have to
  set primary DNS authority to point to the company you've chosen. You
  should not have a named daemon answering requests from outside your
  private network. Other details, such as handling of email, will depend
  on the specifics of the service you've subscribed to, and can best be
  answered by the support staff of that company.


  One final note: if you want to have remote access to a machine with a
  dynamic IP, but don't need it for hosting other services, the
  inexpensive solution is to create a ``drop box'' on a publicly
  accessible machine with a static IP, and have your dynamic IP host
  send its IP number there, either in email or simply by writing it into
  a file on a shell account. When you want to access your machine
  remotely, first extract the current IP number from the drop box, then
  use slogin to attach directly to that IP number. This is, after all,
  really all that a dynamic IP hosting service does, they just do it
  automatically over standard services, saving you some steps.



  5.  Registering A Domain Name

  In order for people in the outside world to locate your servers under
  the domain name of your choice, whether for web, FTP, or email
  delivery, you will have to register the domain name for insertion into
  the relevant top level domain database.


  Exercise some simple prudence in choosing your domain name. Certain
  words or phrases may be forbidden on the grounds of community
  standards, or may be offensive to visitors whose language or slang
  differs from that of your region. Domain names can contain only the 26
  letters of the Roman alphabet (without accents), the hyphen (though
  not at the beginning or end of the name), and the 10 digits. Domain
  names are not case-sensitive, and can be at least 26 characters long
  (this limit is subject to change). Be careful not to register a name
  which you can reasonably have been expected to know infringes on the
  trademarks of an existing company, the courts are not kind to
  cybersquatters. Some information on the circumstances under which your
  poorly-chosen domain name might be stripped from your control are
  available in this Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
  <http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm>.


  There are many companies which register names in the ``.com'',
  ``.net'', and ``.org'' top level domains. For a current list, check
  the list of accredited registrars
  <http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html>.


  To register a name under a country top level domain, such as a
  ``.ca'', ``.de'', ``.uk'', etc., check with the appropriate authority,
  which can be located in the Country Code Top-Level Domains database
  <http://www.iana.org/cctld.html>.


  Typically, you have to provide the registrar with contact information,
  primary and secondary DNS IP numbers, a change request validation
  scheme (you wouldn't want just anybody changing your domain for you),
  and money in the form of an annual fee. If you're not comfortable with
  the change request validation schemes offered by a registrar, let them
  know that you're not willing to use the service until they address
  your security concerns.



  6.  Deciding Which Domain Services You Will Host

  Most full-service ISPs will provide a variety of domain services for
  their customers. This is largely because of the problems associated
  with hosting these services under certain other, more popular desktop
  and server operating systems. These services are much easier to
  provide under Linux, and can be hosted on fairly inexpensive hardware,
  so you should decide what services you want to take on for yourself.
  Some of these services include:

  o  Primary DNS authority on your domain. See section ``Primary DNS
     Authority''.

  o  Electronic mail. See section ``Electronic Mail''.

  o  Web space hosting. See section ``Web Space Hosting''.

  o  FTP space hosting. See section ``FTP Site Hosting''.

  o  Packet filtering. See section ``Packet Filtering''.

  In each of these, you basically have to weigh convenience against
  control. When your ISP performs one or more of these services, you can
  usually be fairly sure that they have people with experience
  maintaining the service, so you have less to learn, and less to worry
  about. At the same time, you lose control over these services. Any
  changes require that you go through the technical support of your ISP,
  something which may sometimes be inconvenient or cause longer delays
  than you would like. There's also a security issue involved, the ISP
  is a much more tempting target to attackers than your own site. Since
  an ISP's servers might host email and/or web space for the dozens of
  companies which are their customers, an attacker who compromises one
  of those servers gets a much higher return for his efforts than one
  who attacks your personal servers, where only one company's data is
  kept.



  6.1.  Primary DNS Authority

  When a person somewhere in the outside world attempts to connect to a
  machine in the new example.com domain, queries are sent between
  various servers on the Internet, ultimately resulting in the IP number
  of that machine being returned to the software of the person
  attempting the connection. The details of this sequence are beyond the
  scope of this document. Neglecting many details, when a request is
  made for the machine fred.example.com, a centralized database is
  consulted to determine what is the IP number of the machine which
  holds primary DNS authority for the example.com domain. This IP number
  is then queried for the IP number of the machine fred.example.com.


  There must be a primary and a secondary DNS server for every domain
  name. The names and IP numbers of these two servers are stored in a
  centralized database whose entries are controlled by domain
  registration authorities such as Network Solutions
  <http://www.networksolutions.com/>.


  If you elect to have primary DNS authority hosted by your ISP, these
  two servers will probably both be machines controlled by the ISP. Any
  time you want to add an externally visible machine to your network,
  you will have to contact the ISP and ask them to put the new machine
  in their database.


  If you elect to hold primary DNS authority on your own host, you will
  still use another machine as your secondary. Technically, you should
  use one on a redundant Internet connection, but it is very common that
  the secondary is held on one of your ISP's machines. If you want to
  add an externally visible machine to your network, you will have to
  update your own database, and then wait for the change to propagate
  (something which takes, typically, a small number of hours). This
  allows you to add barney.example.com without having to go through your
  ISP.


  It is a good idea to set up secondary DNS on a geographically distant
  host, so that a single cable cut near your ISP doesn't take both your
  primary and secondary DNS servers off line. The domain registrar you
  used to register your domain name may provide secondary DNS service.
  There is also a free service, Granite Canyon
  <http://www.granitecanyon.com/>, available to anybody who asks.


  Regardless of whether or not you choose to act as primary DNS
  authority for your domain, see section ``Setting Up Name Resolution''
  for configuration help. You will want some sort of name resolution
  system for your private network, even if you delegate primary DNS
  authority to the ISP.



  6.2.  Electronic Mail

  When you subscribe with your ISP, they will typically supply a number
  of email boxes. You can elect to use this service exclusively, in
  which case all incoming email is stored on the ISP's servers and your
  users read their mail with POP3 clients which connect to the ISP's
  servers. Alternately, you may decide to set up email on your own
  machines. Once again, you should weigh the merits of the two
  approaches, and choose the one which you prefer.


  Things to remember if you use the ISP for all email:

  o  It may be easier to access the email from home, or from other
     locations when you're on a business trip, depending on the security
     which you use to protect your domain.

  o  Email is routinely stored on the ISP's servers, which may be a
     problem if sensitive material is sent unencrypted.
  o  You have a limited number of email accounts, and may have to pay if
     you exceed this limit.

  o  To create a new email address, you have to go through the ISP.


  Things to remember if you provide your own email:

  o  Email is routinely stored on your own servers, with backup storage
     on your ISP if your mail host goes down or its disk fills up.

  o  You have an essentially unlimited number of email accounts, which
     you can create and delete yourself.

  o  You have to support the email clients used on your private network,
     and possibly by people trying to read their email from home.


  One possible approach is to host email yourself, but also use the
  several email addresses provided by the ISP. People who need email
  accessible from outside the private network can have an email address
  in your domain which gets redirected to one of the ISP-supplied email
  addresses. Others can have local email on the private network. This
  requires a bit more coordination and configuration, but gives more
  flexibility than either of the other approaches.


  Should you choose to host email for your domain, see section ``Setting
  Up Email For Your Domain'' for configuration help.


  If you decide not to host email for your domain, refer to section
  ``DNS Configuration If You Are Not Hosting Email'' for important notes
  on the name resolution configuration.



  6.3.  Web Space Hosting

  Your ISP may allocate you a certain amount of space on their web
  servers. You might decide to use that, or you might have a web hosting
  machine which you put on your external network, in one of your
  external IP numbers.


  Points to remember if you choose to use the ISP's web space hosting:

  o  You have a certain disk space allocation which you should not
     exceed. This will include not only web space contents, but also
     data collected from people visiting the site.

  o  The bandwidth between your web server and the outside world will
     almost certainly be higher than it would be if you hosted it on
     your own hardware. In any case, it will not be slower.

  o  It may be difficult to install custom CGI scripts or commercial
     packages on your web site.

  o  Your bandwidth between your network and your web server will almost
     certainly be lower than it would be if you hosted it on your own
     network.


  Points to remember if you choose to host your own web space:


  o  You have much more control over the hosting machine. You can tailor
     your security more precisely for your application.

  o  Potentially sensitive data, such as credit card numbers or mailing
     addresses, remains on machines which you control.

  o  Your backup strategy is probably not as comprehensive as your
     ISP's.


  Notice that I do not mention anything about the ISP having more
  powerful hardware, higher peak data rates, and so on. By the time
  these things become important, you're talking about very high data
  rate network connections, and, quite frankly, you had better be
  delegating these decisions to a skilled consultant, not looking in a
  Linux HOWTO.


  Should you choose to host web space for your domain on your own
  server(s), refer to other documents, such as the WWW-HOWTO
  <ftp://metalab.unc.edu/pub/Linux/docs/HOWTO/WWW-HOWTO>, for
  configuration help. I strongly recommend that this service be run on a
  different machine from the private network gateway machine, for
  security reasons.



  6.4.  FTP Site Hosting

  Basically, the same arguments apply to FTP hosting as apply to WWW
  hosting, with the exception that active content is not an issue for
  FTP, and CGI scripts don't appear. Most of the recent ftpd exploits
  have come from buffer overruns resulting from the creation of large
  directory names in anonymously-writable upload directories, so if your
  ISP allows uploads and is lax in keeping up with security updates on
  the FTP daemon, you might be better off hosting this service yourself.


  Should you choose to host FTP for your domain on your own server(s),
  make sure to get the latest version of your FTP daemon, and consult
  the configuration instructions there. Once more, I strongly recommend
  that this service be run on a different machine from the private
  network gateway machine, for security reasons.


  For wu-ftpd, I would recommend the following configuration options:

  o  --disable-upload - unless you need anonymous uploads

  o  --enable-anononly - encourage your local users to use scp to
     transfer files between machines.

  o  --enable-paranoid - disable whatever features of the current
     release might be considered questionable.



  6.5.  Packet Filtering

  Some ISPs will put packet filters on their network, to protect the
  users of the system from each other, or from external attackers. Cable
  modem networks and similar broadcast networks have had embarrassing
  problems when users of Windows 95 or 98 inadvertently set up disk
  shares, exporting the full contents of their hard drives to anybody on
  the network segment who cared to browse for active servers in the
  neighbourhood.  In some cases, the solution has been to tell the users
  not to do that, but some providers have put filtering into the access
  hardware to prevent people from exporting their data by accident.


  Packet filtering is really something which you ought to do yourself.
  It fits in easily into the kernel running on your private network
  gateway machine and gives you a better idea of what's happening around
  you. You often will find that you have to make small tweaks to the
  firewall to optimize it during the initial setup, and this is much
  easier to do in real time than through a technical support contact.


  Should you choose to do packet filtering for your domain, see section
  ``Setting Up Packet Filtering'' for configuration help.




  7.  Configuring Your Hosted Services

  7.1.  Setting up Name Resolution

  You will want some way for the computers on your network to refer to
  one another by name, and also a way for people in the outside world to
  refer to your exposed hosts by name. There are several ways to go
  about doing this.


  7.1.1.  DNS On Private Network, ISP Handles Domain

  [ Note: if you have chosen not to implement a private network, go to
  section ``Fully Exposed Network, Hosted By ISP''. ]


  In this configuration, you have delegated responsibility for the
  primary DNS authority on your domain to the ISP. You still use DNS
  within your private network when hosts there want to talk to one
  another. You have given your ISP a list of the names and IP numbers of
  all exposed hosts. If you want one externally visible machine, for
  instance betty.example.com, to act both as web and FTP server, you
  should ask the ISP to make CNAME entries for www.example.com and
  ftp.example.com pointing to betty.example.com.


  Set up DNS on your private network gateway machine. This can be done
  securely, and makes upgrading easier, should you later decide to host
  primary DNS authority for your domain.


  I will assume that you have decided to host DNS from the machine
  dns.example.com, which is on the private network gateway, and an alias
  for fred.example.com at 192.168.2.1. Some small modifications have to
  be made to this configuration if this is not the case. I will not
  cover that in this HOWTO unless there is significant interest.


  You will have to download and compile a recent version of BIND, the
  Berkeley Internet Name Domain. It is available at the BIND web site
  <http://www.isc.org/products/BIND/>. Next, you have to configure the
  daemon.  Create the following file, /etc/named.conf:






  ______________________________________________________________________
  options {
          directory "/var/named";
          listen-on { 192.168.1.1 };
  };

  zone "." {
          type hint;
          file "root.hints";
  };

  zone "0.0.127.in-addr.arpa" {
          type master;
          file "pz/127.0.0";
  };


  zone "1.168.192.in-addr.arpa" {
          type master;
          file "pz/1.168.192";
  };

  zone "example.com" {
          type master;
          notify no;
          file "pz/example.com";
  };
  ______________________________________________________________________




  Note that we are declaring ourselves the master for the example.com
  domain. Meanwhile, our ISP is also declaring itself to be the master
  for the same domain. This is not a problem, as long as you are careful
  about the setup. All of the machines on the private network must use
  dns.example.com to perform their name resolution. They must not use
  the name resolvers of the ISP, as the ISP name server believes itself
  to be authoritative over your entire domain, but it doesn't know the
  IP numbers or names of any machines on your private network.
  Similarly, hosts on exposed IP numbers in your domain must use the ISP
  name server, not the private name server on dns.example.com.


  The various files under /var/named must now be created.


  The root.hints file is exactly as described in the BIND documentation,
  or in the DNS HOWTO <ftp://metalab.unc.edu/pub/Linux/docs/HOWTO/DNS-
  HOWTO>. At the time of this writing, the following is a valid
  root.hints file:















  ______________________________________________________________________
  H.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  128.63.2.53
  C.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  192.33.4.12
  G.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  192.112.36.4
  F.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  192.5.5.241
  B.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  128.9.0.107
  J.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  198.41.0.10
  K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  193.0.14.129
  L.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  198.32.64.12
  M.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  202.12.27.33
  I.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  192.36.148.17
  E.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  192.203.230.10
  D.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  128.8.10.90
  A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.     6d15h26m24s IN A  198.41.0.4
  ______________________________________________________________________





  The pz/127.0.0 file is as follows:


       ______________________________________________________________________
       $TTL 86400

       @               IN      SOA     example.com. root.example.com. (
                                       1       ; Serial
                                       8H      ; Refresh
                                       2H      ; Retry
                                       1W      ; Expire
                                       1D)     ; Minimum TTL
                               NS      dns.example.com.
       1                       PTR     localhost.
       ______________________________________________________________________





  The pz/1.168.192 file is as follows:


       ______________________________________________________________________
       $TTL 86400

       @       IN      SOA             dns.example.com. root.dns.example.com. (
                                       1       ; Serial
                                       8H      ; Refresh 8 hours
                                       2H      ; Retry   2 hours
                                       1W      ; Expire  1 week
                                       1D      ; Minimum 1 day
                               )
                       NS      dns.example.com.

       1               PTR     fred.example.com.
                       PTR     dns.example.com.
                       PTR     mail.example.com.
       2               PTR     barney.example.com.
       3               PTR     wilma.example.com.
       ______________________________________________________________________




  and so on, where you create one PTR record for each machine with an
  interface on the private network. In this example, fred.example.com is
  on IP number 192.168.1.1, and is pointed to by the dns.example.com and
  mail.example.com aliases. The machine barney.example.com is on IP num-
  ber 192.168.1.2, and so on.


  The pz/example.com file is as follows:


       ______________________________________________________________________
       $TTL 86400

       @               IN      SOA     example.com. root.dns.example.com. (
                                       1       ; Serial
                                       8H      ; Refresh 8 hours
                                       2H      ; Retry   2 hours
                                       1W      ; Expire  1 week
                                       1D      ; Minimum 1 day
                               )
                               NS              dns.example.com.
               IN              A               192.168.1.1
               IN              MX          10  mail.example.com.
               IN              MX          20  <ISP mail machine IP>.


       localhost               A           127.0.0.1
       fred                    A           192.168.1.1
                               A           10.1.1.9
       dns                     CNAME       fred
       mail                    CNAME       fred
       barney                  A           192.168.1.2
       wilma                   A           192.168.1.3
       betty                   A           10.1.1.10
       www                     CNAME       betty
       ftp                     CNAME       betty
       ______________________________________________________________________




  Note that we create entries for machines both within the private net-
  work and on external IPs, since machines within the private network
  will not query the ISP's name servers for a request on, say,
  betty.example.com. We also provide both IP numbers for fred, the pri-
  vate and external IP numbers.


  One line in the ``options'' section of /etc/named.conf bears
  discussion:


       listen-on { 192.168.1.2 };




  This will prevent your named daemon from answering DNS requests on the
  outside interface (all requests from the outside must go through the
  ISP's name resolver, not yours).



  7.1.2.  Non-DNS Resolution On Private Network, ISP Handles Domain

  [ Note: if you have chosen not to implement a private network, go to
  section ``Fully Exposed Network, Hosted By ISP''. ]
  In this configuration, you have decided that your private network is
  fairly small and unlikely to change often. You have decided not to use
  the centralized database of a DNS server, and instead to maintain the
  host resolution separately on each machine. All machines should use
  the ISP's DNS server for their host name resolution for machines
  beyond the private network gateway. For name resolution on the private
  network, a hosts table has to be created. For Linux, this means
  entering the names and IP numbers of all of the machines on the
  private network into the /etc/hosts on each machine. Any time a new
  machine is added, or a name or IP number is changed, this file has to
  be updated on each Linux box.


  As in section ``DNS Resolution on Private Network, ISP Handles
  Domain'', the list of host names on exposed IP numbers must be sent to
  the ISP, and any aliases (such as for www and ftp names) should be
  specified so that a CNAME entry can be created by the ISP.



  7.1.3.  You Are Primary DNS Authority For Domain

  While you could set up named resolution on the exposed hosts, and
  private database resolution for the private network, I will not cover
  that case. If you're going to be running named for one service, you
  ought really to do it for both, just to simplify the configuration. In
  this section I will assume that the private network gateway machine is
  handling name resolution both for the private network and for outside
  requests.


  At the time of this writing, under version 8.2.2 of the BIND package,
  there is no way for a single named daemon to produce different answers
  to requests, depending on which interface the request arrives on. We
  want name resolution to act differently if the query comes from the
  outside world, because IP numbers on the private network shouldn't be
  sent out, but have to be available in answer to requests from within
  the private network. There is some discussion of a new ``views''
  keyword which may be added to BIND to fill this need at a later date,
  but until that happens, the solution is to run two named daemons with
  different configurations.


  First, set up the private network domain name server as described in
  section ``DNS Resolution on Private Network, ISP Handles Domain''.
  This will be the name resolver visible from within your private
  network.


  Next, you have to set up DNS for your domain, as visible to hosts in
  the outside world. First, check with your provider to see if they will
  delegate reverse lookups of your IP numbers to them. While the
  original DNS standard didn't account for the possibility of
  controlling reverse DNS on subnets smaller than a class C network, a
  workaround has been developed which works with all compliant DNS
  clients, and has been outlined in RFC 2317
  <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2317.txt>. If your provider is willing to
  delegate control of reverse DNS on your IP block, you will have to
  determine from them the exact name of the in-addr pseudo-domain they
  have chosen to delegate to (the RFC does not offer a convention they
  recommend for everyday use), and you will have to register control for
  that pseudo-domain. I will assume that the provider has delegated
  control to you, and the name of the pseudo-domain is 8.1.1.10.in-
  addr.arpa. The provider would create CNAME entries of the form


  8.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.     2H IN CNAME 8.8.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.
  9.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.     2H IN CNAME 9.8.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.
  10.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.    2H IN CNAME 10.8.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.
  etc.




  in their zone file for the 1.1.10.in-addr.arpa domain. The configura-
  tion of your 8.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa zone file is given later in this
  section.


  If your provider is willing to delegate control of the reverse DNS to
  you, they will create CNAME entries in their reverse DNS zone table
  for those IP numbers you control, pointing to the corresponding
  records in your pseudo-domain, as shown above. If they are not willing
  to delegate control to you, you will have to ask them to update their
  reverse DNS entries any time you add, delete, or change the name of an
  externally visible host in your domain. If the reverse DNS table is
  not synchronized with your forward DNS entries, certain services may
  generate warnings, or refuse to handle requests issued by machines
  affected by the mismatch.


  You now have to create a second named setup, this one to handle
  requests issued by machines outside the private network gateway. This
  setup lists only those hosts and IP numbers which are externally
  visible, and responds only to requests on the outside interface of the
  private network gateway machine.


  First, create a second configuration file, for instance
  /etc/named.ext.conf for requests from the external interface. In our
  example, it might be as follows:


       ______________________________________________________________________
       options {
               directory "/var/named";
               listen-on { 10.1.1.9; };
       };

       zone "." {
               type hint;
               file "root.hints";
       };

       zone "0.0.127.in-addr.arpa" {
               type master;
               file "pz/127.0.0";
       };


       zone "8.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa" {
               type master;
               file "ext/8.1.1.10";
       };

       zone "example.com" {
               type master;
               notify no;
               file "ext/example.com";
       };
       ______________________________________________________________________

  The root.hints and pz/127.0.0 files, both under /var/named are shared
  with the other running daemon. The file ext/8.1.1.10 is as follows:


       ______________________________________________________________________
       $TTL 86400

       @       IN      SOA             fred.example.com. root.fred.example.com. (
                                       1               ; Serial
                                       10800           ; Refresh       3 hours
                                       3600            ; Retry         1 hour
                                       3600000         ; Expire        1000 hours
                                       86400 )         ; Minimum       24 hours
                       NS      dns.example.com.
       9       IN      PTR     fred.example.com.
                       PTR     dns.example.com.
                       PTR     mail.example.com.
       10      IN      PTR     betty.example.com.
                       PTR     www.example.com.
                       PTR     ftp.example.com.
       ______________________________________________________________________





  The file ext/example.com contains the following:


       ______________________________________________________________________

       $TTL 86400

       @               IN      SOA     example.com. root.fred.example.com. (
                                       10021   ; Serial
                                       8H      ; Refresh 8 hours
                                       2H      ; Retry   2 hours
                                       1W      ; Expire  1 week
                                       1D      ; Minimum 1 day
                               )
                               NS              fred.example.com.
               IN              A               209.217.100.58
               IN              MX          10  mail.example.com.
               IN              MX          20  <ISP Mail Machine>.


       localhost               A           127.0.0.1
       fred                    A           10.1.1.9
       betty                   A           10.1.1.10
       dns                     CNAME       fred
       mail                    CNAME       fred
       www                     CNAME       betty
       ftp                     CNAME       betty
       ______________________________________________________________________





  Start the two daemons on the private network gateway machine. Put the
  following into your network daemon initialization scripts:


       /usr/sbin/named -u dnsuser -g dnsgroup /etc/named.conf
       /usr/sbin/named -u dnsuser -g dnsgroup /etc/named.ext.conf

  I've assumed here that you have created the unprivileged user
  ``dnsuser, and the corresponding unprivileged group ``dnsgroup''. If a
  bug in bind turns up, which allows an attacker to execute code from
  within named, the attacker will find himself restricted to those oper-
  ations available to the unprivileged user. The /var/named directory
  and the files within should not be writable by ``dnsuser''.


  The machines on the private network must have their name resolution
  configured to ask dns.example.com (at IP 192.168.1.1 in our example),
  while the externally visible machines can either query the network
  gateway's outside interface (at IP 10.1.1.9 in our example), or the
  ISP's DNS servers.




  7.1.4.  Fully Exposed Network, Hosted By ISP

  In this configuration, you have chosen to expose all of your hosts.
  You have a real IP number for each machine in your domain, and you've
  given your ISP the list of machine names and IP numbers. The ISP has
  given you at least one IP number for their DNS host(s). Your Linux
  boxes are now configured for name resolution in /etc/resolv.conf:


       ______________________________________________________________________
       search example.com
       nameserver <DNS host 1>
       nameserver <DNS host 2>
       ______________________________________________________________________





  Windows boxes are configured with the same parameters, in the network
  settings dialogues.



  7.2.  DNS Configuration If You Are Not Hosting Email

  The configurations described in section ``Setting Up Name Resolution''
  have MX records pointing to a machine ``mail.example.com''. The MX
  record with the lowest priority number following tells remote sites
  where to send email. Other MX records with higher priority numbers are
  used as backup email receivers. These backups will hold the mail for a
  certain period of time if the primary email receiver is not able to
  accept the messages for some reason. In the examples in that section,
  I have assumed that fred.example.com, under its alias of
  mail.example.com, is handling email for the domain. If you have chosen
  to let the ISP handle all of your email hosting, you should change
  those MX records to point to the appropriate ISP machines. Ask your
  ISP technical support representative what host names you should use
  for the MX records in the various files.



  7.3.  Setting up Electronic Mail

  If you have chosen to do full electronic mail hosting for your domain,
  you'll have to take special actions for email coming from hosts on the
  private network, and for allowing transparent mail reading from
  anywhere within the private network. Unless you're careful, messages
  are likely to sit around for long times if they are waiting on one
  host, and the intended recipient is logged on another machine. For
  security reasons, I recommend that the incoming email not be
  accessible from the externally visible hosts (this might help to
  discourage a PHB who wants his desktop machine to be on a real IP,
  then wonders why he gets brought down by a ping of death twice a day).
  A transparent email sharing system on the private network fairly
  straight-forward in sendmail. If anybody wants to provide tested
  solutions for other mail handling daemons, I welcome additions.


  7.3.1.  A Solution Using "sendmail"

  In order that email delivered to one host be visible on all machines,
  the simplest solution is to export the mail spool directory with read-
  write privileges over the entire private network. The private network
  gateway machine will also act as mail collector and forwarder for the
  entire private network, and so must have root write privileges to the
  mail spool drive. The other clients may or may not squash root, at
  your discretion. My general security philosophy is not to grant
  privileges unless there is a clear reason for it, so I squash root on
  the mail spool network drive for all hosts except the private network
  gateway machine. This has the effect that root can only read his mail
  from that machine, but this is not a particularly serious handicap.
  Note that the mail spool drive can be a directory on the private
  network gateway machine, exported via NFS, or it can be a directory on
  one of the internal servers, exported to the entire private network.
  If the mail spool drive is resident on the private network gateway,
  there is no issue of squashing root for that machine. If it is on
  another server, then note that email will be undeliverable if that
  server, the gateway machine, or the network connecting them, is down.


  For Windows machines on your private network, you may either set up a
  POP server on the mail spool host, or use samba to export the mail
  spool to those machines. The Windows machines should be configured to
  send and retrieve mail under a Linux username, such as
  joeuser@example.com, so that the email address host name is the bare
  domain name, not a machine name like barney.example.com. The outgoing
  SMTP host should be set to the private network gateway machine, which
  will be responsible for forwarding the mail and doing any address
  rewriting.


  Next, you should configure sendmail to forward email from the machines
  on the private network, rewriting the addresses if necessary. Obtain
  the latest sources to sendmail from the sendmail.org WWW site
  <http://www.sendmail.org/>. Compile the binaries, then go to the
  cf/domain subdirectory within the sendmail source tree, and create the
  following new file: example.com.m4

















  ______________________________________________________________________
  divert(-1)
  #
  # Copyright (c) 1998 Sendmail, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  # Copyright (c) 1983 Eric P. Allman.  All rights reserved.
  # Copyright (c) 1988, 1993
  #       The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
  #
  # By using this file, you agree to the terms and conditions set
  # forth in the LICENSE file which can be found at the top level of
  # the sendmail distribution.
  #
  #

  #
  #  The following is a generic domain file.  You should be able to
  #  use it anywhere.  If you want to customize it, copy it to a file
  #  named with your domain and make the edits; then, copy the appropriate
  #  .mc files and change `DOMAIN(generic)' to reference your updated domain
  #  files.
  #
  divert(0)
  define(`confFORWARD_PATH', `$z/.forward.$w+$h:$z/.forward+$h:$z/.forward.$w:$z/.forward')dnl
  FEATURE(redirect)dnl
  MASQUERADE_AS(example.com)dnl
  FEATURE(masquerade_envelope)dnl
  ______________________________________________________________________





  This defines the domain ``example.com''. Next, you have to create the
  sendmail.cf files which will be used on the mail host (the private
  network gateway), and on the other Linux nodes on the private network.


  Create the following file in the sendmail source tree, under cf/cf:
  example.master.m4



























  ______________________________________________________________________
  divert(-1)
  #
  # Copyright (c) 1998 Sendmail, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  # Copyright (c) 1983 Eric P. Allman.  All rights reserved.
  # Copyright (c) 1988, 1993
  #       The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
  #
  # By using this file, you agree to the terms and conditions set
  # forth in the LICENSE file which can be found at the top level of
  # the sendmail distribution.
  #
  #

  #
  #  This is the prototype file for a configuration that supports nothing
  #  but basic SMTP connections via TCP.
  #
  #  You MUST change the `OSTYPE' macro to specify the operating system
  #  on which this will run; this will set the location of various
  #  support files for your operating system environment.  You MAY
  #  create a domain file in ../domain and reference it by adding a
  #  `DOMAIN' macro after the `OSTYPE' macro.  I recommend that you
  #  first copy this to another file name so that new sendmail releases
  #  will not trash your changes.
  #

  divert(0)dnl
  OSTYPE(linux)dnl
  DOMAIN(example.com)dnl
  FEATURE(nouucp)
  FEATURE(relay_entire_domain)
  FEATURE(`virtusertable', `hash /etc/sendmail/virtusertable')dnl
  FEATURE(`genericstable', `hash /etc/sendmail/genericstable')dnl
  define(`confPRIVACY_FLAGS', ``noexpn,novrfy'')dnl
  MAILER(local)
  MAILER(smtp)
  Cw fred.example.com
  Cw example.com
  ______________________________________________________________________




  In this example we have disabled the ``expn'' and ``vrfy'' commands.
  An attacker could troll for aliases with ``expn'', trying names like
  ``staff'', ``allstaff'', ``office'', and so on, until he hits an alias
  which expands out several usernames for him. He can then try the user-
  names against certain weak passwords in hopes of getting in (assuming
  he can get a login prompt - the security settings described in section
  ``Securing Your Domain'' are set up so that no login prompt is avail-
  able for off-site attackers).


  The other file you should create will define the sendmail.cf for the
  slave machines: example.slave.m4










  ______________________________________________________________________
  divert(-1)
  #
  # Copyright (c) 1998 Sendmail, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  # Copyright (c) 1983 Eric P. Allman.  All rights reserved.
  # Copyright (c) 1988, 1993
  #       The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
  #
  # By using this file, you agree to the terms and conditions set
  # forth in the LICENSE file which can be found at the top level of
  # the sendmail distribution.
  #
  #

  #
  #  This the prototype for a "null client" -- that is, a client that
  #  does nothing except forward all mail to a mail hub.  IT IS NOT
  #  USABLE AS IS!!!
  #
  #  To use this, you MUST use the nullclient feature with the name of
  #  the mail hub as its argument.  You MUST also define an `OSTYPE' to
  #  define the location of the queue directories and the like.
  #  In addition, you MAY select the nocanonify feature.  This causes
  #  addresses to be sent unqualified via the SMTP connection; normally
  #  they are qualified with the masquerade name, which defaults to the
  #  name of the hub machine.
  #  Other than these, it should never contain any other lines.
  #

  divert(0)dnl

  OSTYPE(linux)
  FEATURE(nullclient, fred.$m)
  Cm example.com
  ______________________________________________________________________





  You build the appropriate sendmail.cf files with the command:


       make example.master.cf example.slave.cf




  and then copy the files to the appropriate machines under the name
  sendmail.cf.


  This configuration puts most of the sendmail configuration files under
  the /etc/sendmail/ subdirectory. This configuration causes sendmail to
  parse and use two special files, virtusertable.db and
  genericstable.db. To use these special files, create their parent
  files. First, virtusertable.src:


       ______________________________________________________________________
       John.Public@example.com                 jpublic
       Jane.Doe@example.com                    jdoe@somemachine.somedomain
       abuse@example.com                       root
       Pointyhaired.Boss@example.com           #phb#@hotmail.com
       ______________________________________________________________________

  This maps the email addresses on incoming email to new destinations.
  Mail sent to John.Public@example.com is delivered locally to the Linux
  account jpublic. Mail to Jane.Doe@example.com is redirected to another
  email account, possibly in a different domain. Mail to abuse@exam-
  ple.com is sent to root, and so on.  The other file is generic-
  stable.src:


       ______________________________________________________________________
       jpublic                                 John.Public@example.com
       janedoe                                 Jane.Doe@example.com
       whgiii                                  Pointyhaired.Boss@example.com
       ______________________________________________________________________




  This file renames the sender on outgoing email from locally-sourced
  mail. While it clearly can't affect the return address for mail sent
  directly from jdoe@somemachine.somedomain, it allows you to rewrite
  the sender's email address from the internal usernames to whatever
  email address convention you've chosen. Finally, create the following
  Makefile in /etc/sendmail/:


       ______________________________________________________________________
       all : genericstable.db virtusertable.db

       virtusertable.db : virtusertable.src
               makemap hash virtusertable < virtusertable.src

       genericstable.db : genericstable.src
               makemap hash genericstable < genericstable.src
       ______________________________________________________________________




  Run make to create the hashed files which sendmail can use, and remem-
  ber to re-run make and restart sendmail (or send it a SIGHUP) after
  any changes to either of these ``.src'' files.



  7.3.2.  Solutions Using Other Mail Transfer Agents

  My experience is only with sendmail. If anybody would like to write
  this section, please contact me. Otherwise, I may, at some later time,
  try to provide details myself on such MTAs as Postfix, Exim, or smail.
  I'd really rather somebody wrote these sections who uses those
  programs.



  7.4.  Setting up Web Space Hosting

  You should set up your externally visible web server on a machine
  outside the private network, and not on the private network gateway
  machine, for security reasons. If the web server needs access to
  databases or other resources stored on the private network, the
  situation becomes more complicated, both from a network and a security
  standpoint. Such configurations are beyond the scope of this document.


  The details of setting up the server itself can be found in the apache
  documentation, and in the Linux WWW HOWTO
  <ftp://metalab.unc.edu/pub/Linux/docs/HOWTO/WWW-HOWTO> document.





  7.5.  Setting up FTP Hosting

  Once again, your FTP host should be an externally visible machine, and
  not the private network gateway machine. Follow the setup directions
  which ship with your FTP daemon package. Be sure to download the most
  recent version of the daemon, as there are security vulnerabilities in
  some older versions of many daemons. If your FTP site does not require
  anonymous users to upload files, be sure to disable that feature in
  the daemon. I recommend that user (non-anonymous) FTP logins not be
  permitted on the FTP host, that you require your regular users to use
  scp, the secure shell remote copy command, for any file updating they
  may have to do on the FTP host. This is to help build secure habits in
  the users, and to protect against the ``hostile router'' problem
  described in section ``Securing Your Domain''.



  7.6.  Setting up Packet Filtering

  This is discussed in detail in section ``Configuring Your Firewall''.



  8.  Securing Your Domain

  This section deals with setting up security for your new domain. The
  emphasis is on user-transparent features. If your security is too
  obtrusive, and interferes strongly with the actions of the users, the
  users will develop their own workarounds which may compromise the
  entire domain. The best way to avoid this is to make the security as
  transparent as possible, and to encourage users to come to you first
  when they have difficulties which might be related to the security
  measures of the site. A certain flexibility in attitude is important.
  I know from personal experience that if the security policy is too
  rigid, the users will simply set up their own network tunnels through
  the firewall so they can log in from outside the domain. It's better
  that remote login procedures, or whatever the users are trying to do,
  be set up, inspected, and approved by you.


  This section deals with securing your network against outside attack,
  and against casual snooping from within. Securing your site against
  determined attack from validated users within the private network is a
  more difficult and involved task, and is beyond the scope of this
  document.


  One of the security considerations used in this section is protecting
  against the ``hostile router''. The router provided by your ISP may be
  a remotely configurable computer in its own right, with the
  administrative password held by your provider. There have been
  security problems in the past when the router's manufacturer override
  password (the one used when your ISP forgets the password they
  programmed in) has become known to system crackers. When possible, you
  should design your security around the assumption that the router is
  potentially hostile. That is, it could be using any IP number in your
  public or private network blocks, it could be redirecting traffic on
  outgoing packets to another site, and it could be recording anything
  which goes through.

  8.1.  Configuring Your Firewall

  This section deals with configuring an ipchains-based masquerading,
  forwarding, filtering router. You should probably read the IPCHAINS-
  HOWTO <ftp://metalab.unc.edu/pub/Linux/docs/HOWTO/IPCHAINS-HOWTO>
  document first, then look here for additional hints. That HOWTO
  describes the steps necessary to compile a kernel with masquerading
  support, and describes the use of the ipchains binary in detail. You
  should enable firewalling on all machines with exposed IP numbers.


  Check your startup scripts to make sure that the sequence is as
  follows on the private network gateway machine:

  1. Outside Ethernet card is initialized.

  2. Firewall rules are run through ipchains.

  3. Forwarding is turned on.

  4. Network service daemons are started.

  So, as an example, on a Slackware-based system, the firewall
  configuration should come between the execution of rc.inet1 and
  rc.inet2. Further, if any problems arise during the firewall
  configuration steps, a warning should be printed, and the external
  Ethernet card taken off line before the network service daemons are
  run.


  One common problem with ipchains-based firewalls is the tedium of
  making sure that your rules are correctly set for packets arriving
  from the loopback interface, or arriving from either of the internal
  or external interfaces on the firewall machine. These locally-sourced
  packets can be blocked by a firewall. All too often, this is fixed by
  a sort of shotgun debugging approach, whereby the rules for the
  firewall are tweaked until all applications seem to run properly on
  the firewall host again. Unfortunately, this can sometimes result in a
  firewall which has unintended holes. With ipchains it is possible to
  write a firewall script which is easily debugged, and which avoids
  many of the packet source problems. Here is a sample script,
  /sbin/firewall.sh:
























  ______________________________________________________________________
  #! /bin/sh
  #
  # New firewalling script using IP chains. Creates a filtering router
  # with network masquerading.
  #

  # define a few variables

  IPCHAINS=/sbin/ipchains

  LOCALNET="192.168.1.0/24"   # the private network
  ETHINSIDE="192.168.1.1"             # fred.example.com's private IP #
  ETHOUTSIDE="10.1.1.9"               # fred.example.com's public IP #
  LOOPBACK="127.0.0.1/8"
  ANYWHERE="0/0"
  OUTSIDEIF=eth1                  # fred.example.com's private interface

  FORWARD_PROCENTRY=/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward

  #
  # These two commands will return error codes if the rules
  # already exist (which happens if you run the firewall
  # script more than once). We put the commands before "set -e"
  # so that the script doesn't abort in that case.

  $IPCHAINS -N outside
  $IPCHAINS -N portmap

  set -e                  # Abort immediately on error setting
                          # up the rules.


  #
  # Turn off forwarding and clear the tables

  echo "0" > ${FORWARD_PROCENTRY}

  $IPCHAINS -F forward
  $IPCHAINS -F input
  $IPCHAINS -F output
  $IPCHAINS -F outside
  $IPCHAINS -F portmap


  #
  # Masquerade packets from within our local network destined for the
  # outside world. Don't masquerade packets which are local to local

  $IPCHAINS -A forward -s $LOCALNET -d $LOCALNET -j ACCEPT
  $IPCHAINS -A forward -s $ETHOUTSIDE -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT
  $IPCHAINS -A forward -s $LOCALNET -d $ANYWHERE -j MASQ

  #
  # Set the priority flags. Minimum delay connections for www, telnet,
  # ftp, and ssh (outgoing packets only).

  $IPCHAINS -A output -p tcp -d $ANYWHERE www -t 0x01 0x10
  $IPCHAINS -A output -p tcp -d $ANYWHERE telnet -t 0x01 0x10
  $IPCHAINS -A output -p tcp -d $ANYWHERE ftp -t 0x01 0x10
  $IPCHAINS -A output -p tcp -d $ANYWHERE ssh -t 0x01 0x10


  #
  # Anything from our local class C is to be accepted, as are
  # packets from the loopback and fred's external IP.
  $IPCHAINS -A input -s $LOCALNET -j ACCEPT
  $IPCHAINS -A input -s $LOOPBACK -j ACCEPT
  $IPCHAINS -A input -s $ETHOUTSIDE -j ACCEPT



  # We'll create a set of rules for packets coming from the big, bad
  # outside world, and then bind all external interfaces to it. This
  # rule will be called "outside"
  #
  # We also create a "portmap" chain. The sockets used by daemons
  # registered with the RPC portmapper are not fixed, and so it is
  # a bit difficult to set up filter rules for them. The portmap
  # chain is configured in a separate script.


  #
  # Send packets from any outside interface to the "outside"
  # rules chain. This includes the $OUTSIDEIF interface and any
  # ppp interfaces we create for dialout (or dialin).

  $IPCHAINS -A input -i ${OUTSIDEIF} -j outside
  $IPCHAINS -A input -i ppp+ -j outside


  ##################################################
  #
  #  Set up the "outside" rules chain              #
  #
  ##################################################

  #
  # Nobody from the outside should claim to be coming from our localnet
  # or loopback

  $IPCHAINS -A outside -s $LOCALNET -j DENY
  $IPCHAINS -A outside -s $LOOPBACK -j DENY

  #
  # No packets routed to our local net should come in from outside
  # because the outside isn't supposed to know about our private
  #  IP numbers.

  $IPCHAINS -A outside -d $LOCALNET -j DENY

  #
  # Block incoming connections on the X port. Block 6000 to 6010.

  $IPCHAINS -l -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 6000:6010 -j DENY

  #
  # Block NFS ports 111 and 2049

  $IPCHAINS -l -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 111 -j DENY
  $IPCHAINS -l -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 2049 -j DENY
  $IPCHAINS -l -A outside -p UDP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 111 -j DENY
  $IPCHAINS -l -A outside -p UDP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 2049 -j DENY

  #
  # Block XDM packets from outside, port 177 UDP

  $IPCHAINS -l -A outside -p UDP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 177 -j DENY


  #
  # Block the YP/NIS port 653
  $IPCHAINS -l -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 653 -j DENY

  #
  # Don't bother logging accesses on TCP port 80, the www port.

  $IPCHAINS -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 80 -j DENY

  #
  # Accept FTP data and control connections.

  $IPCHAINS -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE 20:21 -d $ANYWHERE 1024: -j ACCEPT

  #
  # Accept ssh packets

  $IPCHAINS -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE ssh -j ACCEPT

  #
  # Accept DNS packets from outside

  $IPCHAINS -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 53 -j ACCEPT
  $IPCHAINS -A outside -p UDP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 53 -j ACCEPT

  #
  # Accept SMTP from the world

  $IPCHAINS -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 25 -j ACCEPT

  #
  # Accept NTP packets

  $IPCHAINS -A outside -p UDP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 123 -j ACCEPT

  #
  # Accept no tap ident packets, we don't use them

  $IPCHAINS -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE 113 -j DENY

  #
  # Turn off and log all other packets incoming, TCP or UDP, on privileged ports

  $IPCHAINS -l -A outside -p TCP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE :1023 -y -j DENY
  $IPCHAINS -l -A outside -p UDP -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE :1023 -j DENY

  #
  # Check against the portmapper ruleset

  $IPCHAINS -A outside -j portmap


  ##############################################
  #
  #    End of "outside" rules chain            #
  #
  ##############################################


  #
  # Block outgoing rwho packets

  $IPCHAINS -A output -p UDP -i $OUTSIDEIF -s $ANYWHERE 513 -d $ANYWHERE -j DENY

  #
  # Prevent netbios packets from leaving

  $IPCHAINS -A output -p UDP -i $OUTSIDEIF -s $ANYWHERE 137 -d $ANYWHERE -j DENY
  #
  # Turn on forwarding

  echo "1" > ${FORWARD_PROCENTRY}
  ______________________________________________________________________




  Notice that the firewall can be used not only to block incoming pack-
  ets, but also outgoing packets which might leak information about your
  private network, such as rwho and netbios packets.


  As noted earlier, the portmapper rules are a bit different, because
  the portmap daemons register themselves with the portmapper and are
  told which ports to listen on. The ports used by a particular daemon
  may change as you change the RPC services used, or change their order
  of startup. The following script, /sbin/firewall.portmap.sh generates
  rule sets for the portmapped daemons:


       ______________________________________________________________________
       #! /bin/sh
       #
       ANYWHERE=0/0

       IPCHAINS=/sbin/ipchains

       $IPCHAINS -F portmap

       # Rules for preventing access to portmapped services by people on the outside
       #
       /usr/bin/rpcinfo -p | tail +2 | \
               { while read program vers proto port remainder
                 do
                       prot=`echo $proto | tr "a-z" "A-Z"`
                       $IPCHAINS -l -A portmap -p $prot -s $ANYWHERE -d $ANYWHERE $port -j DENY || exit 1
                 done
               }
       ______________________________________________________________________




  We didn't have to worry about whether packets coming in were legiti-
  mate packets from the private network, the portmap chain is only
  checked when the packets come in from the outside.


  This firewall configuration logs most suspicious packets through klogd
  with the kern.info logging priority. It will log normal connection
  attempts, as well as all known ``stealth'' probes.


  Now, we put these all together. We'd like to make sure that there
  isn't a small window of vulnerability while the system is starting up,
  so you should configure your startup sequence as follows:








  ______________________________________________________________________
  #! /bin/sh
  #
  # Get the network started, securely
  #
  #
  /etc/rc.d/rc.inet1              # Configure the network interfaces
                                  # and set up routing.
  /sbin/firewall.sh || { echo "Firewall configuration failed"
                         /sbin/ifconfig eth1 down }

  /sbin/ipchains -I outside 1 -j DENY     # Deny all incoming packets

  /etc/rc.d/rc.inet2              # Start the network daemons

  sleep 5                         # Let them stabilize

  # Secure the portmapped services
  /sbin/firewall.portmap.sh || { echo "Portmap firewall configuration failed"
                                 /sbin/ifconfig eth1 down }

  /sbin/ipchains -D outside 1       # Allow incoming packets
  ______________________________________________________________________




  This assumes that eth1 is the interface on the externally visible IP
  number. If any of the ipchains rule sets fail to install, a warning is
  issued and that interface is taken off line. The ``outside'' chain is
  set to deny all packets before the network service daemons are
  started, because the firewalling rules are not yet in place for the
  portmapped services. Once the portmapped services are firewalled, the
  ``outside'' chain is restored to its proper behaviour.



  8.2.  Configuring SSH1

  At the time of this writing, OpenSSH (v1.2pre17) doesn't offer one of
  the features I mention here, but OpenSSH is under very active
  development, and this could change at any time. The particular feature
  which is missing is a configuration setting which allows you to insert
  scp, ssh, and slogin as binaries named rcp, rsh, and rlogin, with
  transparent fall-through in the ssh client programs to the original
  rsh, rcp, or rlogin when the remote site isn't running sshd. Making an
  invocation of rsh run, instead, the ssh client program is, in my
  opinion, important for keeping the security easy to use and out of the
  way of the users. Everybody's scripts, rdist configurations, and so on
  will continue to work without modification if the remote site is
  running sshd, but data will be sent encrypted, with strong host
  authentication.


  Obtain ssh1 from the ssh web site <http://www.ssh.org/>, and compile
  it to replace the unencrypted r-programs (rsh, rlogin, and rcp).
  First, copy those three files to /usr/lib/rsh/, then configure the ssh
  package with:


        ./configure --with-rsh=/usr/lib/rsh/rsh --program-transform-name='s/^s/r/' --prefix=/usr




  Install the binaries, and configure according to the directions. On
  the private network gateway machine, make sure that the sshd configu-
  ration has the following entries defined:


       ListenAddress 192.168.1.1       # fred's internal IP
       IgnoreRhosts no
       X11Forwarding yes
       X11DisplayOffset 10
       RhostsAuthentication no
       RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
       RSAAuthentication yes
       PasswordAuthentication yes




  You will have to do further configuration of other entries in the
  /etc/sshd_config file, but try not to change these fields. Once you
  have all of the entries in the file set to your satisfaction, copy
  this entire file into a new file, /etc/sshd_config.ext, for the exter-
  nal network. Change two fields in the new file: the ``ListenAddress''
  should be changed to the private network gateway's external IP number
  (10.1.1.9 in our fred.example.com case), and ``PasswordAuthentica-
  tion'' should be set to ``no'' in /etc/sshd_config.ext. In your net-
  work services startup script, start sshd twice, once with


       /usr/sbin/sshd




  and once with


       /usr/sbin/sshd -f /etc/sshd_config.ext




  This will create two running sshd daemons. The one operating on the
  internal interface will allow logins with passwords, but the external
  interface will require an RSA key validation before anybody can log
  on.


  Next, turn off incoming telnet and shell services in the inetd
  configuration file (note that the firewall configuration listed in
  section ``Configuring Your Firewall'' already prevents access from
  outside, but it's best to defend in depth, don't rely on everything
  working correctly).


  People who want to be able to log in from home, or from out of town,
  will need an RSA key. Make sure they know how to do this, so they
  don't spend their energies trying to figure out another way to do it,
  like running a telnetd on an unprivileged port on your firewall
  machine.


  An RSA key is generated by the command:


       ssh-keygen -b 1024 -f new_rsa_key


  You will be prompted for a pass phrase. This should not be blank. A
  person with access to the file new_rsa_key, and knowledge of the pass
  phrase, has everything necessary to pass an RSA authentication chal-
  lenge. The pass phrase can be an ``unguessable'' password, or a long
  sentence, but make it something non-trivial. The file new_rsa_key can
  be copied to a floppy disk, or onto a laptop, and, along with the pass
  phrase, can be used to log into accounts which are set to grant access
  to that particular RSA key.


  To configure an account to allow access by a particular RSA key,
  simply create a $HOME/.ssh/ directory for that user on the private
  network gateway machine (i.e. the machine which will be receiving the
  login attempt), and copy the file new_rsa_key.pub which was created by
  the "ssh-keygen" command into the file $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys. See
  the section ``AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT'' in the sshd man page for
  details on other options you can add to the key, such as requiring the
  login to come from a certain IP or host name, or authorizing the key
  only to permit the remote invocation of certain commands (for
  instance, an RSA key which commands a backup to take place, or
  commands a status report to be emailed somewhere off site).


  Only one thing remains to make the RSA key mechanism as gentle as
  possible to the users. If a user is forced to enter the pass phrase
  more than once or twice in a session, they are likely to become bored
  and take security matters into their own hands. Under Linux, arrange
  their login shell to be invoked under ssh-agent. For instance, if the
  company laptop used on business trips runs xdm, and drops users into
  an X session, go into the /var/X11R6/lib/xdm/Xsession_0 file and
  change the lines which invoke the startup, which are probably of the
  form:


       exec "$startup"




  into lines of the form:


       exec ssh-agent "$startup"




  In my xdm setup, there are three such lines which should be altered in
  that one file. Now, when the user logs onto the laptop, he enters the
  command


       ssh-add new_rsa_key




  at any prompt, enters the pass phrase when prompted, and all windows
  will have pass phrase-free access to the account on the private net-
  work gateway until the user logs off his X session on the laptop.


  Run sshd on all of the machines on your private network, as well as on
  any exposed hosts. For machines other than the private network gateway
  machine, the ListenAddress entry in /etc/sshd_config can be set to
  ``0.0.0.0''.  You should set up the host keys with the command:
       ssh-keygen -b 1024 -f /etc/ssh_host_key -N ""




  then run make-ssh-known-hosts and distribute the /etc/ssh_known_hosts
  file among all of the machines on the private and public networks.


  Disable incoming telnet and the unencrypted r-services. Don't delete
  the telnet binary, it's useful for things other than simple telnet
  sessions on port 23. You should allow password authentication on the
  private network, and disable it on the exposed machines, requiring an
  RSA key to log onto the exposed hosts.


  It is convenient for the users if the hosts on the private network are
  mentioned in each other's /etc/hosts.equiv files. The sshd daemons
  will respect those, and allow people to rlogin and rsh between
  machines without passwords or pass phrases. On every connection, the
  machines will be verifying each other's identities with host-level RSA
  keys.


  One difficulty arises when a user logged onto a machine on the private
  network wants to log onto a box on an exposed IP number. You can't use
  /etc/hosts.equiv or $HOME/.shosts to allow password-less validation,
  because the user is coming from a machine whose IP number cannot be
  determined - it will appear to be coming from the masquerading
  firewall machine, but the host keys won't match. There are two
  solutions to this. First, if you insist on using the /etc/hosts.equiv
  or $HOME/.shosts methods, the user will have to log onto the private
  network gateway machine (fred.example.com in our example here), and
  then log through to the exposed machine from there. The other
  technique is to use RSA key authentication, that always works
  regardless of what games are going on with IP numbers and host name
  lookups.



  8.3.  Configuring X

  In the user's continuing quest to prove that he values convenience
  over security, it has become common for people to put


       xhost +




  commands right into their X initialization scripts. This grants X
  server access to everybody in the world. Now the random outsider can
  change your root window graphic to something embarrassing while your
  boss is showing his mother around your office. Alternately, this out-
  sider can quietly monitor every keystroke you issue, and dump the con-
  tents of your screen to his desktop. Needless to say, this doesn't
  bode well for passwords used to log into other sites, or for sensitive
  documents being edited on screen. The xhost protocol itself is inher-
  ently limited, as it is not possible to grant permissions to use the
  screen on a user basis, only on a machine basis.


  Enter xauth authentication. If you have xdm you probably already are
  running xauth authentication, but xhost still works, and might still
  be what people are using to run X processes between machines. Once
  again, the goal is to make the security easy enough to use that the
  users aren't tempted to run the xhost command anymore.


  The sshd setup described in section ``Configuring SSH1'', with the
  ``X11Forwarding'' flag set, is actually simpler to use than the xhost
  technique. Once you have logged into your terminal, you can simply
  rlogin to a remote machine, and run netscape, xv, or whatever you
  like, without having to set the $DISPLAY variable name or allow
  explicit permissions. During ssh login, it configures the system in a
  way transparent to the end user, and even encrypts all of your X
  packets before they go over the network.


  If you are unable to use the sshd X11 forwarding for some reason, you
  should use xauth when you want to authorize other machines to have
  access to your X server. Document this for the users, or create
  specialized shell scripts to help them out. The relevant command to
  authorize a particular login, ``jpublic'', on machine ``barney'' to
  have access to your X server is:



       /usr/X11/bin/xauth extract - $DISPLAY | rsh -l jpublic barney /usr/X11/bin/xauth merge -





  I'd be tempted to delete xhost from your machines entirely. If it
  causes problems with any programs, you will at least know that those
  programs had poorly-designed security. It's simple enough to build a
  shell script as a drop-in replacement for xhost which uses the xauth
  sequence listed above.


  Note that if rsh is not the encrypting ssh program, the xauth key is
  sent plaintext. Anybody who holds the plaintext of the key can access
  your server, so you do not gain much security if you don't use ssh for
  these transactions. Note, also, that if the users' home directories
  are exported via NFS (the Network File System), the xauth key is
  available in plaintext to anybody able to snoop those NFS packets,
  regardless of whether you're running ssh on your systems.



  8.4.  Configuring Disk Sharing

  With email coming to a central machine, the read/send from any host
  setup described here is very convenient, but some care has to be taken
  to protect against trivial snooping by bored local users. NFS without
  AUTH_DES implemented is inherently insecure. NFS relies on the client
  machine to authenticate access, there is no password verification on
  the server to make sure that the client should be permitted to access
  the private files of a particular user. A Windows box can be
  configured to read NFS-exported volumes as any numeric uid, completely
  bypassing UNIX file permissions.  Consequently, NFS exports should
  only be made to machines which are always Linux (or UNIX) boxes under
  your direct control, and never ones which can be dual-booted into
  Windows.  If you want to export the mail spool directory, or any other
  directory, to machines which can sometimes be used as Windows boxes,
  export them with samba, setting the authentication mode to
  ``security=USER''. Connecting the machines on your network with a
  switch rather than a hub will also help, as it leaves very little of
  interest for sniffers on Windows machines. Ultimately, though, it's
  very difficult to secure any disk sharing over the network at the time
  of this writing.


  Why bother, if you can't really secure the network disks? Mostly it's
  an issue of credible defense. If you leave a sheet of paper on your
  desk with confidential information, and somebody in the office reads
  it, he can argue that he didn't realize what the paper was, his
  natural curiosity just got the better of him when he saw it sitting on
  the desk. If the sheet of paper were in a filing cabinet or desk
  drawer, it's an entirely different story. The purpose of taking some
  basic network security measures internally is to ensure that nobody
  ``accidentally'' compromises security.



  9.  Acknowledgements

  This document was written as internal documentation for the DYNACAN
  project, as part of the project's continuing development under the
  control of the Ministry of Human Resources Development Canada.


  This document has benefited considerably from the suggestions of

  o  Rod Smith (rodsmith@rodsbooks.com <mailto:rodsmith@rodsbooks.com>),
     who suggested I provide details on registering a domain name and on
     setting up with a dynamic IP, and pointed me at the various dynamic
     IP hosting services and at Granite Canyon.

  o  Greg Leblanc (gleblanc@my-deja.com <gleblanc@my-deja.com>) for
     useful suggestions on improving the clarity of the document.

  o  Sami Yousif (syousif@iname.com <mailto:syousif@iname.com>), who
     told me about www.dhs.org.



  10.  Glossary of Terms

  This is a list of the meanings of some of the words and acronyms used
  in this document.


     CGI Script
        A Common Gateway Interface Script. This is a program which is
        run on demand to generate the content of a web page. If a web
        page has to do more than simply feed an unchanging text and
        graphics display to the viewer, you will probably need some sort
        of dynamic content generation program such as a CGI Script.
        Examples include discussion boards, feedback forms, e-commerce
        shopping carts, and more.

     DHCP
        Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. A standard, defined in RFC
        1531, for computers on a TCP/IP network to request from a
        central server information such as the IP number they should be
        using, the netmask, the gateway, etc. Rather than an
        administrator entering this information into the machine
        configuration, the machine simply requests it from the server as
        it is preparing to attach to the network.

     DNS
        Domain Name Service. A standard for translating domain names
        into ``IP Number''s, or vice versa, by looking up data in
        centralized databases.

     DSL
        Digital Subscriber Line. A relatively high speed network
        connection, usually delivered through specialized telephone
        wiring.

     Dynamic IP Number
        An ``IP Number'' which is assigned periodically or on a per-
        session basis. No guarantee is made that the number will remain
        constant. A dynamic IP number might change only when your
        network connection hangs up and reconnects, or it might change
        periodically under ``DHCP'' negotiation. Certain session-based
        services such as telnet and ssh will stop working if the IP
        number of either end of the connection is changed during the
        session.

     Forward DNS Query
        A ``DNS'' query which converts a domain name into an ``IP
        Number''.

     FTP
        The File Transfer Protocol. A standard system for sending files
        between machines over the Internet.

     ftpd
        The daemon responsible for providing ``FTP'' services on a host.
        It responds to queries initiated by a remote client.

     Internet Service Provider
        See ``ISP''.

     IP See ``IP Number''.

     IP Number
        The ``address'' of a certain network interface. Under the
        current addressing standard, called ipv4, this number consists
        of four 8-bit values, generally written as base-10 numbers
        separated by dots. Communication between computers on the
        Internet is based on packets of information sent between IP
        numbers.

     ISP
        Internet Service Provider. The company which provides your
        network connectivity, including connection hardware, service
        hosting, and leasing out the IP numbers under their control.

     Masquerading
        A form of filtering in which packets from one machine to the
        outside world have their headers rewritten so that they appear
        to come from an intermediate machine. That intermediate machine
        then passes responses back to the originating machine. The net
        effect is that an entire network of machines can appear to use a
        single IP number, that of the masquerading host, for the purpose
        of outgoing connections.

     named
        The name server daemon. This is the daemon which answers ``DNS''
        queries, and is distributed as part of the BIND package.

     Network Time Protocol
        See ``NTP''.

     NTP
        Network Time Protocol. A standard for synchronizing your system
        clock with the ``true time'', defined as the average of many
        high-accuracy clocks around the world.

     OS Operating system. Linux, Windows, FreeBSD, BeOS, HP-UX, etc.

     PHB
        Pointy-Haired Boss
        <http://www.unitedmedia.com/comics/dilbert/about/html/boss.html>.
        A creation of Scott Adams, of Dilbert fame.

     Provider
        See ``ISP''.

     Reverse DNS Query
        A ``DNS'' query which converts a ``IP Number'' into a domain
        name.

     Router
        A specialized hardware device which implements rules for where
        to send packets based on their ``IP Number''s, and which bridges
        between your Ethernet hardware and whatever communications
        medium connects you to your ``ISP''.

     ssh
        The secure shell. A cryptographically strong replacement for
        rlogin, telnet, ftp, and other programs.  Protects against
        ``spoofing'', man in the middle attacks, and packet sniffing.

     Static IP Number
        An ``IP Number'' which has been assigned or leased to you
        permanently. Barring revocation of the agreement which granted
        you this number, that IP number will always be available for
        your use, and no other machine on the Internet is allowed to use
        that number. Contrast this with ``Dynamic IP Number''s.



































